Sartre's View of Kierkegaard as Transhistorical Man (Published in the Journal of Philosophical Research)
Forty years ago, Jean-Paul Sartre presented an address entitled "The Singular Universal" at a UNESCO conference dedicated to the 100 th anniversary of Søren Kierkegaard's death. 1 This address discusses several provocative themes such as non-objective knowledge, the incompleteness of the Hegelian system, and the transhistoricity of persons. Yet perhaps due to the opacity of the writing, the work languishes in relative anonymity amidst an otherwise wellknown corpus. Nevertheless, I believe there is a coherent argument to be found in this address that connects these themes and sheds light on an important motif in Sartre's later writings, namely that of the singular universal. I intend to move through the address in linear fashion in order to unearth this argument.
I. The Problem of Transhistoricity
Sartre begins by finding in the name of the conference an occasion for discussing his central worry. The conference was billed as "Kierkegaard Living", which is a seemingly innocuous title for a series of lectures on the state of Kierkegaard studies a hundred years after his death. But
Sartre sees something paradoxical in this name. For it is not the case that Kierkegaard is living;
nor would it make sense to entitle any conference "So-and-so Living" if that person were still alive. Thus, Sartre concludes "Kierkegaard Living" really means Kierkegaard is dead and also that Kierkegaard is the topic of conversation.
Sartre's problem with talking about Kierkegaard after he has died is that he is no longer what he was. While alive he was an individual subject, an agent of free choice. But since that 2 time death has intervened and robbed him of his subjectivity. In fact, this is what Sartre thinks death always does: it turns agents into objects of knowledge (SU 230-231). At first glance, this transition appears to benefit historians because it gives them an apt candidate for historical
inquiry. Yet there is a potential problem. If, as Sartre believes, the true nature of a living person involves being a subject, the transition that occurs at death removes something important. As a consequence, historians who inquire after the dead will always be limited to what is inessential.
The question then becomes whether it is at all possible to gain access to the subjectivity of someone who has died. If so, if (for example) Kierkegaard can become a living subject for us today, then we have what Sartre calls "the strictly historical paradox of survival." That is, we have the paradox that "a historical being, beyond his abolition, can still communicate as a nonobject, as an absolute subject, with the generations that follow his own" (SU 231). Kierkegaard's subjectivity then has validity not only in his own historical time period, but also in ours. He becomes, in short, a transhistorical man. But if this is not the case, if Kierkegaard cannot become a living subject for us today, then we have lost him forever. In his absolute subjectivity, he forever eludes our clutches.
In summary, either we have "the transhistoricity of historical man" in general and of Kierkegaard in particular, or we lose Søren qua Søren. Either it is possible for a person to have validity as a subject not only in his own historical time period but also in others (and hence be "transhistorical"), or once a person is dead his subjectivity is lost and gone forever. Resolving this dilemma is the goal of Sartre's address. are now homogeneous (SU 240). Hence, despite its elusive character, Kierkegaard's lived experience really added nothing new to the equation. True, it was the mechanism for making 6 things turn out this way, but it was nothing more than this. In Sartre's poetic words, it was merely "a small surface agitation which soon calms down to allow the dialectical development of concepts to appear" (SU 241). Thus, anything about Kierkegaard's subjectivity that managed to defy the Hegelian system was purely provisional and ultimately inessential to the true nature of Kierkegaard's being (SU 240). Therefore, there is no truly irreducible remainder after everything that can be said about Kierkegaard has been said.
Unsurprisingly, Sartre refuses to concede this point; he denies that death alleviates the problem posed by subjectivity. To motivate this denial he cultivates an argument for the opposite conclusion, namely that death actually heightens the problem to the point of absolute scandal (SU 240 and 243). In this argument Sartre employs another historical example, namely the failure of Emmanuel de Grouchy's army to rejoin Napoleon at Waterloo (SU 242). Here, in the "failed attempt of an army officer," we have a concrete moment in history. But notice what happens when time passes and Grouchy dies: the concrete moment becomes an "absolute."
Grouchy can no longer rejoin Napoleon and not even God can make it so. His failure to realize his goal is sealed forever; it is sealed absolutely (SU 242).
But, we might ask, how does this "negative absolute" reveal anything scandalous?
Furthermore, how does it reveal anything scandalous about Grouchy's subjectivity? The answer to these questions lies in Sartre's choice of a historical failure instead of a historical success. 5 Sartre believes Grouchy's failure (like all failures) refers us to a hidden subjective moment, namely his experience of this failure (SU 242-243). What keeps this experience hidden from us is the fact that it cannot be seen as relative to any positive historical moment. If Grouchy had successfully rejoined Napoleon, we could say his experience of the event was a necessary but provisional mechanism for making this historical moment an actual moment. We could even go 7 on to describe this event in its totality and claim to have exhaustive knowledge of the whole situation. But Grouchy fails. His expectation of rejoining Napoleon never finds expression in the world and thus his experience does not bring any specific historical moment to life (SU 243). For this reason, Sartre claims Grouchy's subjectivity is absolutely irreducible to any historical knowledge and hence is absolutely scandalous. Therefore, the second objection does not hold.
III. The Nature of the "Irreducible Remainder"
At this point in the text, a question signals a change in direction: "Can one go further" (SU 243)?
This marks the end of Sartre's worries about whether there is anything irreducible about
Kierkegaard's subjectivity and henceforth he assumes the matter is settled. The issue now becomes whether we can somehow manage to access this subjectivity in spite of its irreducibility. Sartre approaches this issue by saying more about what he means by "subjectivity"
and why Kierkegaard's life serves as a paradigm example of this notion. Unfortunately, this discussion is very dense. In essence, it contains a version of the "dialectic of the subjective and the objective" presented in Search for a Method. 6 The treatment of the topic in this earlier work is clearer and its connection with the present address has been documented by other commentators. 7 Thus it is without hesitation that I will play off both texts in an effort to present the three steps of this dialectic. Sartre thinks this way of experiencing life reveals something of a paradox. Kierkegaard is able to look at the deterministic forces of history as if they were "in the beginning indeterminate"
(SU 234). This does not by itself refute the necessity of the Hegelian system (Sartre still believes the dialectical progression is inevitable), but it does show something strange. To be specific, Kierkegaard's insight shows that the necessary Hegelian moments do not come into existence independent of all conditions. Their existence depends on singular events that could have been otherwise. Thus, although each moment will inevitably arise, there is no fixed way in which it will do so. And this is indeed a paradox: Hegel's historical necessities are also historical accidents (SU 251). of possibilities has a population greater than one (SM 93). In other words, however precisely a person's "given" may determine his future, it does not do so absolutely. There will always be some room for variation. The upshot of this is that the individual is free and experiences the anxiety that comes along with being able to determine the specifics of his own future (SU 253).
In addition, this is a situation he cannot escape; for all the possible avenues of retreat (suicide, passivity, etc.) are themselves free choices. Thus the second part of the subjective moment also begins with the experience of a paradox: choosing, although free, is a necessity (SU 255). There is something more here that must be brought to light. When historians and anthropologists see in the man's action an instance of a wider cultural phenomenon or the dawn of a new age for his country, they are de facto understanding his action as an incarnation of a Hegelian moment or universal. As we have already said, Sartre believes the historical progression of these moments is deterministic, something he makes explicit in the case of the struggling colonials (SU 235). Thus from the historian's perspective the man's action takes on the form of necessity: he was destined to rebel against the colonialist regime. Yet it is always a "two-sided coin," for the man's actions are also free and worked out within a field of possibilities (SU 255). He truly does cause history to deviate with his choices -but "only in conformity with what this very course should be" (SU 255). Once again we are left with a paradox: a free and hence contingent action introduces meaning that was ultimately necessary.
III.D. The Irreducibility of Kierkegaard 12
The purpose of looking at this dialectic was to expose the formal structures of the "irreducible remainder" contained within the subjective moment. The hope was that this would provide a background against which we could see, as Sartre does, how Kierkegaard But just as Sartre thinks it would be a mistake to be single-mindedly Freudian or singlemindedly Hegelian in one's approach to Kierkegaard, so too does he think it would be a mistake to focus only on the objective aspects of Kierkegaard's life. As we have seen, he believes there is something more to human beings than this. There is something about an individual that remains after all that can be reduced to objective determinations has been so reduced. And we now know what Sartre thinks this is. It is the individual's lived experience of freely realizing personal projects within a contingent, historical framework.
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At this point a new problem arises. For the moral of the Grouchy example was that an individual's subjectivity is irreducible only if it fails to find meaningful expression in the world. Here we discover why Sartre thinks we can catch hold of Kierkegaard's irreducible remainder. As we now know, the source of his irreducibility lies in his subjectivity. And up to this point the historical distance between him and us has created a barrier because the only thing we have had is historical knowledge, which does not adequately account for subjectivity.
However, if the view Sartre presents in "the myth of Adam" is correct, there is a way around this problem. By virtue of the fact that I (like everyone else) am Kierkegaard, his "lived experience"
becomes my "lived experience" (SU 263). I thereby become a subjective witness to what was initially only Kierkegaard's to view. In short, I catch hold of his irreducible remainder.
V. Conclusion
On the surface, it might seem as if this entire discussion of the paradox of transhistoricity is epistemological in nature. Indeed the stated goal is to determine whether it is possible to know everything about Kierkegaard. However, like Sartre's investigations into Jean Genet and Flaubert, this investigation has an underlying metaphysical agenda. This agenda is important because it allows us to understand the importance of the present address for Sartre's later thought.
It is possible to bring to light the metaphysical agenda by exposing its connection to the epistemological project. This can be done as follows. On the epistemological level Sartre discusses whether we can know more about Kierkegaard qua historical figure than what we learn from objective facts. In other words, he discusses the accessibility of Kierkegaard's "irreducibility." As it turns out, Kierkegaard's "irreducible remainder" is to be found in lived experience or inwardness, "nearly the perfect secret place" for him to hide from objective knowledge (SU 259). However, Sartre's inspection of this secret place reveals something interesting, namely that it is also the arena in which Kierkegaard discovers himself as free. In David Sherman puts it, attempting to construct "an amalgam of existential phenomenology and
Marxism." 11 Given the above, we can say that the essay on Kierkegaard is another attempt to create such an amalgam. In fact Kierkegaard's struggle to find a place for subjectivity and
